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 Executive Summary 
 
Introducing private sector participation (PSP) into the water and sewerage sectors in 
developing countries is difficult and controversial.  Empirical studies on its effects are scant and 
generally inconclusive. Case studies tend to find improvements in the sector following 
privatization, but they suffer from selection bias and it is difficult to generalize from their results.  
To explore empirically the effects of PSP, we assemble a new dataset of connections to water 
and sewerage services at the city and province level based on household surveys in Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Brazil.  The household surveys, conducted over a number of years, allow us to 
compile data before and after the introduction of PSP as well as from similar (control) regions 
that never privatized at all.  Our analysis reveals that, in general, connection rates to piped water 
and sewerage improved following the introduction of PSP, consistent with the case study 
literature.  We also find, however, that connection rates similarly improved in the control 
regions, suggesting that PSP, per se, may not have been responsible for those improvements.  On 
the other hand, connection rates for the poorest households also tended to increase in the regions 
with PSP and in the control regions, suggesting that—in terms of connections at least—PSP did 
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From the end of the Second World War until the middle of the 1980s, network utilities 
(e.g., electricity, telecommunications, and water) were vertically and horizontally integrated 
monopolies in almost every country in the world.  Although these monopolies were privately 
owned in a few countries, most notably in the United States, in most they were state-owned.  By 
the late 1980s, a combination of technological change and a better understanding of the cost of 
monopoly and state provision led many observers to question whether this was an effective way 
of providing infrastructure services.
1  This, in turn, led to sector reform, with governments 
privatizing state-owned enterprises, introducing competition in areas where it was possible, and 
forming new regulatory agencies.  For the most part, reform appears to have improved 
performance.  In particular, in the sector where most cross-country empirical work has focused, 
the telecommunications sector, there is strong evidence that competition and privatization have 
increased service availability, improved productivity, and reduced retail prices.
2  Furthermore, 
evidence from individual country case studies in this sector appears consistent with the cross-
country results.
3 
Although there has been some liberalization in nearly all sectors, the extent of 
privatization, competition and deregulation has varied greatly.  In sectors where technological 
change has made competition feasible, such as telecommunications, most countries have 
liberalized entry and introduced private sector participation.  In other sectors, however, reform 
has been more limited.  In particular, privatization and competition remain relatively uncommon 
in water and sewerage, reflecting a lack of consensus about how to best organize the sector.  This 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Winston (1993). 
2 Almost without exception, cross-county empirical research in both developed and developing countries has found 
that competition increases the number of telephone connections, improves productivity, and results in lower prices. 
The evidence on privatization is generally positive, although slightly less conclusive.  Recent studies include Li and 
Xu (2002), Petrazzini (1996), Ros (1999), and Wallsten (2001).                                                                                                                                             2 
 
 
is reflected in the variation in the extent to which industrialized countries have involved private 
enterprises in water supply and sewerage (OECD 2000).  For example, even in the United States, 
with its long history of private ownership in most infrastructure sectors, municipalities own and 
operate most water supply and sewerage systems.
4 
Two important differences between water and sewerage and other infrastructure sectors 
help explain the lack of consensus about how to organize the sector.  First, the potential for 
competition is much more limited in water and sewerage than it is in electricity and 
telecommunications.  Second, privatization has proven to be more difficult and more 
controversial in water and sewerage than in other sectors.  As a result, reform has proceeded 
more slowly and, when reforms have occurred, private sector participation has usually been more 
limited. 
Although, in principle, competition is possible in some areas of water supply and 
sewerage—for example competition would be possible for supply of bulk water in a multi-
reservoir system or for sewage treatment (Noll 2002)—in practice, competition has been very 
limited.  This reflects the expense and impracticality of transporting water or sewage over long 
distances, reducing the potential for competition for the supply of bulk water or sewage 
treatment, and that a large portion of the cost of supplying water and collecting sewage is tied up 
in the distribution network, an area where the potential for direct product market competition is 
limited.
5  Although competition for the market is possible in theory, it has proven difficult to 
successfully implement this form of competition in most developing countries. 
It has also proven difficult to introduce private sector participation in the water and 
sewerage sector.  One reason for this is that privatization is more difficult when the private 
operator will be a monopoly than it is when it would operate in a competitive market.  Even in 
the presence of competition, however, additional factors make private sector participation 
controversial.  One is that water is both essential for life and is a natural resource that literally 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 See, for example, Azam et al. (2002), Clarke et al. (2003), Galal and Nauriyal (1995), Haggarty et al. (2003), 
Laffont and N’Guessan (2002) and Shirley et al. (2002). 
4 In contrast, France, generally considered to be relatively interventionist, has a long history of private provision of 
water. 
5 Approximately two-thirds of the cost of water supply is related to the cost of the supply network for water.  In 
contrast, only 40 percent of the cost of supplying electricity is related to network components (London Economics 
1998).                                                                                                                                             3 
 
 
falls from the sky.  Because of this, governments may encounter political and legal obstacles to 
selling sector assets to a private operator.
6 
A second reason why privatization is more difficult is that externalities are more 
pronounced in water and sewerage than in electricity or telecommunications.  The most 
frequently cited externality is health.  Although water users bear much of the cost of consuming 
impure water (i.e., in terms of lost earnings and the pain and inconvenience of disease), the cost 
is not fully internalized, especially for communicable diseases.  Further, leaky pipes, which leave 
standing pools of water that can become breeding grounds for disease-carrying insects, and 
untreated sewage both result in large negative health externalities.  Extracting water from its 
source causes additional externalities.  When water is taken from an aquifer faster than it is 
replenished, the quality of the remaining water decreases—for example, the remaining water 
becomes increasingly difficult to extract and can become salinated, and large sinkholes can 
develop.  For these reasons, externalities are more important in water and sewerage than they are 
in other network industries, increasing the potential scope of regulation beyond simple price. 
A final reason why privatization is more difficult is that a large portion of sector assets 
are fixed in place, have no alternative uses and are extremely long-lived (e.g., the pipes).  This 
makes them especially prone to expropriation by the government.  Even if the government does 
not explicitly expropriate assets, it can implicitly do so by setting tariffs below long-term 
marginal cost.  That is, because fixed costs make up such a large portion of total costs and 
because sector assets can keep operating for a long period without much in the way of 
maintenance, the government has a strong incentive to set tariffs so that they cover operating 
costs but do not provide resources for expansion or even adequate maintenance.  Furthermore, 
the very long-term nature of fixed investment means that self-financing utilities will earn quasi-
rents.  This creates incentives for all sides to use them for purposes other than investment (e.g., 
consumer pressure to reduce tariffs, government pressure to use the funds for other needs, 
investor pressure not to reinvest depending on the likelihood of recouping the investment). 
In addition to discouraging private sector participation altogether, these problems have 
resulted in countries adopting a wide range of different approaches towards private sector 
                                                 
6 See Noll (2002).  As an example of this, Zérah et al. (2001) note that the Argentine government chose a 
concessioncontract in Buenos Aires over full privatization because selling sector assets would have posed legal 
problems.                                                                                                                                             4 
 
 
participation.  Rather than simply selling water and sewerage utilities to private investors, many 
countries have adopted intermediate forms of private sector participation, including various types 
of franchising, lease contracts and concessions, and build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts (e.g., 
Lee and Jouravlev 1997).   
Despite these obstacles, sector reform is vital.  Nearly 20 percent of the world’s 
population does not have access to improved water and more than one-third does not have access 
to improved sanitation (Kessides 2003).  The World Commission on Water estimated that 
mitigating water and sanitation problems would require US$600-800 billion between 2000 and 
2010 (as cited in Bourbigot and Picaud 2001).  Beginning in the 1980s many countries – rich and 
poor – began experimenting with privatization of water systems as a means of boosting 
investment and increasing coverage, efficiency, and water quality.  Indeed, in the 1990s 
developing countries initiated more than 100 water or sewerage projects involving private sector 
participation (Tynan 2000). 
There is little existing rigorous evidence on the effects of introducing PSP into water and 
sewerage.  In this paper we use household-level data to explore the effect on water and sewerage 
coverage over time (before and after privatization) and across cities, including compared to 
control cities that never privatized.  While connections appear to have generally increased 
following privatization, the increases appear to be about the same as in cities that retained public 
ownership of their water systems.  In other words, the analysis provides little evidence that 
privatization itself generated improvements in access.  However, contrary to fears, we also find 
no evidence that poor people served by privatized firms received worse coverage than the poor 
served by public water utilities. 
 
2. Existing Empirical Evidence 
 
Two broad groups of studies evaluate the effects of private sector participation on sector 
performance: multi-utility statistical analyses and single-utility case studies.
7  Despite the 
importance of sector reform, few studies present rigorous statistical results.  Further, the 
                                                 
7 In addition, some “case studies” compare results from multiple utilities, without performing formal statistical 
analysis.  Further, in some other cases, separate case-studies are conducted using similar methodologies in order to 
make the results easier to compare.  See, for example, the case studies in Shirley (2002).                                                                                                                                             5 
 
 
statistical and econometric studies that do exist for developing countries provide neither 
consistent evidence of strong improvements in sector performance following the introduction of 
private sector participation nor robust evidence regarding the relative success of different forms 
of private sector participation.  The inconclusive empirical findings in developing countries are 
consistent with studies of industrialized countries, which also fail to reach a consensus on the 
relative performance of private and public providers (Anwandter and Ozuna 2002). 
The weak evidence from cross-country analyses partially reflects the poor quality of data 
that are available: most studies have relied upon data from few countries for short periods of 
time.  In contrast to cross-country studies in the telecommunications sector, which often rely 
upon hundreds or even thousands of observations from many countries over long periods of time, 
the main cross-country studies of private sector participation in the water sector use samples with 
fewer than 50 observations.
8  Consequently, it might not be surprising that there is typically not 
enough variation either across countries or over time to find strong, statistically significant 
results.  As a result, the main evidence concerning the success of reform in the water and 
sewerage sectors comes from case studies. 
Case studies compare utility performance before and after privatization in a single 
country or city.  The advantage of this type of study is that it is possible to look at a very broad 
range of country and enterprise characteristics and describe how transaction characteristics 
affected outcomes in far greater detail than would be possible in a cross-country or cross-utility 
study.  However, these studies suffer from several notable problems.  The first is simply that it is 
very difficult to assess with certainty why a reform succeeded or failed and even more difficult to 
determine whether the expected results would be different in cases other than the one being 
studied.  In addition, sample selection bias is also a serious concern.  That is, case studies are not 
selected randomly and the success or failure of reform might affect selection – particularly in the 
case of highly successful and highly unsuccessful reforms.  For example, a particularly 
disastrous reform that generates large amounts of press coverage (e.g., the Cochabamba 
concession that was revoked) is probably more likely to be studied than a moderately successful 
reform in a similar country. 
                                                 
8 See Estache and Kouassi (2002), which uses data from twenty-one African utilities from 16 countries for up to 
three years, and  Estache and Rossi (2002), which uses data from fifty utilities from 19 countries in Asia for a single 




Cross-country and cross-utility empirical analyses 
  One approach compares the performance of private and public water utilities across and 
within countries.  In principle, such analyses should provide the most rigorous test of the effect 
of private sector participation (PSP); indeed, we have learned a great deal about 
telecommunications reforms through empirical analyses of cross-country panel data.  And water 
presents a potential advantage over telecommunications from an empirical point of view: while 
telecom reforms are often at the country level, water reforms are typically at the city or province 
level.  As a result, it is possible to compare public and private utilities within the same country, 
something that should help deal with country-level institutional issues. 
  Unfortunately, it is difficult to exploit this advantage.  In contrast to the 
telecommunications sector, where the International Telecommunication Union has collected 
detailed data on coverage, financial performance, service quality and prices for over 200 
countries for over 25 years (for at least some indicators), it is difficult to find comparable cross-
country data on water and sewerage utilities.  Consequently, statistical studies looking at the 
effect of private sector participation on the performance of water and sewerage utilities typically 
rely on small samples  – making it difficult to find statistically significant results and making it 
impossible to control for the wide range of institutional, economic and physical factors that 
might affect sector performance. 
Estache and Rossi (2002) use 1995 data from 50 water companies in 19 countries in Asia 
to explore the effects of ownership on utility performance.  Twenty-two of the 50 companies had 
some form of private sector participation.  The analysis attempted to estimate separately whether 
different types of PSP had different effects, controlling for whether the private participation 
involved a concession, administration (e.g., billing), or other services.  The authors find no 
significant effects of any of the ownership variables.
9  In a study of 21 water utilities in 16 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Estache and Kouassi (2002) find that the private operators were 
more efficient than public operators in these countries.
10 Neither of these studies fully controls 
                                                 
9 Anwandter and Ozuna (2002) note that empirical analyses in industrialized countries were similarly split, with 
some finding positive effects of private sector participation, some finding better outcomes from public ownership, 
and some finding no significant findings either way. 
10 It is important to note that very few of the operators in Estache and Kouassi (2002) had any form of private sector 
participation over this period – apparently only two (see Table 1 in their paper).                                                                                                                                               7 
 
 
for other factors that might affect both enterprise performance and private sector participation.
11 
  One possible reason for the lack of significant findings is that private participation in 
water (or any given sector) does not happen in a vacuum.  The same governance and institutional 
factors in a country that exacerbated problems in the water sector in the first place can cause 
problems under private ownership.  Estache and Kouassi (2002) confirm this, finding that 
measures of institutional quality are an important factor in explaining the efficiency of water 
providers. 
  In addition to the cross-country studies, other studies have exploited the mix of private 
and public water operators within some developing countries.  In 1998 the Chilean government 
began privatizing water companies, and within three years nearly three-quarters of all households 
received water service from private companies.  Bitran and Valenzuela (2003) compare the 
performance of the privatized and public water systems, finding that private companies have 
invested far more than public companies and have kept prices lower.  They state: “perhaps the 
most notable finding in this analysis is not the obvious differences between private and public 
companies, but the speed with which those differences have emerged.”  One area in which the 
public firms seemed to outperform the private firms is in reduction of unaccounted-for-water 
(UFW).  The authors suggest that one reason for this discrepancy is that the state retained the 
firms in dryer regions, where water is more expensive.  This explanation is consistent with Noll’s 
(2002) point that repairing leaks is only worthwhile if the cost of doing so is lower than the value 
of the water that is saved. 
  In a second study, Garn et al. (2000) compare the performance of private water utilities in 
four small towns in Cambodia  to municipal water utilities in four other randomly chosen similar 
towns.  The private utilities performed far better on all measures of performance (related both to 
technical and financial performance and to consumer satisfaction).  One concern about these 
results, however, is that this study does not fully control for the institutional, economic, and 
                                                 
11 In particular, in the parts of the analysis that look at the effect of private sector participation on efficiency, both 
studies use cross-sectional rather than panel data (i.e., fixed effects are not included in that part of the analysis).  
Although Estache and Kouassi (2002) use a panel to estimate the inefficiency measures, the analysis that compares 
the effect of private sector participation on the inefficiency scores is cross-sectional.  Further, neither study includes 
many additional variables to control for other differences in the institutional, economic or physical environment in 
which the utilities operate.  Estache and Kouassi (2002) include two subjective indices to control for corruption and 
governance, while Estache and Rossi (2002) include measures of population density and percent of water from 
surface sources.                                                                                                                                             8 
 
 
physical characteristics that might affect both utility performance and the likelihood of private 
sector participation.  This is a particular concern in this study because the private operators 
approached the towns themselves, offering to operate the water systems.  Since the firms 
probably did not approach the worst performing utilities in the least favorable environments, 
performance differences might reflect that the pre-existing conditions were better in those towns 
rather than that private sector participation improved utility performance.
12 
  Although these studies do not provide strong evidence that private sector participation 
improves enterprise or sector performance, cross-country empirical studies do provide evidence 
on other aspects related to private sector participation.  For example, two recent studies, Harris et 
al. (2003) and Guasch et al (2003), have looked at contract cancellations and renegotiations.  The 
results from these studies suggest that reform might have been less successful that originally 
planned. 
  Despite the extensive press coverage given to some notable cancellations (e.g., in 
Tucumán, Argentina and Cochabamba, Bolivia – see Appendix), there have been relatively few 
outright cancellations of contracts with private operators – although at 3.5 percent of all projects, 
the cancellation rate is only second to that of toll roads (Harris, et al. 2003).  Nonetheless, 
although cancellations are relatively rare, an enormous number of concessions have been 
renegotiated.
13  Although renegotiation is a vital way of dealing with unforeseen circumstances 
and can benefit both sides to a contract, it is important to note that it can undermine the value of 
bidding for the market.  If winning bidders believe that they will be able to renegotiate the terms 
of the contract, they have a strong incentive to bid strategically, planning on renegotiating after 
they have won.  Some observers have suggested that strategic behavior was a problem in the 
bidding for the 30-year concession contract in Buenos Aires (see Appendix). 
  Guasch et al. (2003) find that the existence of a regulator makes it less likely that 
concessions will be renegotiated, while the existence of price caps increases the probability of 
renegotiation.  The fact that a regulatory authority decreases the likelihood of renegotiation 
highlights the importance of having a stable and coherent set of rules – one would expect 
                                                 
12 Moreover, Garn, et al. (2000) note that the sales were not transparent and no regulatory regime has been 
established. 
13 Harris et al. (2003) report that 55 percent of all water concessions in Latin America and the Caribbean were 
renegotiated in the 1990s, while Guasch et al. (2003) report that 63 of 89 water concessions in that region for which 
there was data were renegotiated.                                                                                                                                             9 
 
 
contract renegotiations in environments that are inherently more uncertain.  The increased 
probability of renegotiation that seems to come with price caps is potentially a cause for concern.  
Price caps are supposed to generate an incentive for cost-reduction by limiting the amount by 
which the utility can increase prices.  If the price cap is renegotiated frequently it becomes little 
better than standard cost-of-service regulation, which has proven problematic because it affects 
the firm’s investment incentives and requires that the regulator have enormous information about 
the firm’s cost structure.  
  Although important, efficiency and price are only part of the story.  As discussed 
previously, one important aspect of water and sewerage is the health externalities associated with 
these services.  Although most of the studies discussed above have focused on the effect of 
private sector participation on utility performance and investment, Galiani et al. (2003) look at its 
effect on child mortality, using data from Argentina in the 1990s.  They find that child mortality 
fell eight percent in regions that privatized their water systems, and that the effects were largest 
in the poorest areas.
14 
 
Case study evidence 
  In addition to the evidence from cross-country and within-country comparisons, there is 
also a large literature based upon case studies of individual reforms.  Appendix 1 provides short 
descriptions of many of the reforms discussed in the case study literature.  Although there were 
some notable, and sometimes notorious, failures, most case studies find that private sector 
participation improved sector performance.  The improvements are especially visible in measures 
of coverage, productivity, and water and service quality.  Coupled with these successes, reform 
has often – but certainly not exclusively – been associated with price increases. 
 
Connections and Production   
In most cases, capacity expanded following the introduction of private sector 
participation.  In all cases for which data were available (see Figure 1), the number of 
                                                 
14 The analysis is rigorous: the authors hone their findings by separating out mortality that can be caused by water 
conditions and mortality unrelated to water.  Privatization was uncorrelated with mortality from non-water causes, 
but strongly correlated with mortality caused by water conditions, ruling out spurious correlations.  Moreover, the 
measured effect may be underestimated since their water access data under-sampled the poorest areas, which 
appeared to receive the largest benefits.                                                                                                                                             10 
 
 
connections increased following the introduction of private sector participation.  In eight of the 
ten cases, the total amount of water distributed or produced also increased.    In one case where 
production did not increase--in the concession contract for Corrientes--this was due to a 




It is important to note that system expansion was not restricted to those cases where the 
private sector partners assumed responsibility for investment (i.e., through concession contracts 
or through full ownership).  The reasons for increases in connections and production in cases of 
leases and management contracts varied between the individual cases.  For example, in the 
Mexico City service contracts, the increase in the number of connections appears to be primarily 
due to the regularization of unregistered and illegal connections.  Consequently, the increase in 
connections does not reflect a true increase in consumer welfare – most of the households were 

















Mexico (Mexico City) *
Before After
* To make it easier to make before and after comparisons for other cities, the number of connection in Buenos 
Aires, Mexico City and Côte d’Ivoire are in units 10,000 rather than units of 1,000 (i.e., numbers for Buenos Aires, 
Mexico City and Côte d’Ivoire need to be multiplied by ten for comparability with the other cases).  
Years are: Côte d’Ivoire (1987 and 2000); Gabon (1997 and 2000); Guinea (1988 and 2000); Senegal (1995 and 
2000); Buenos Aires (1992 and 1998); Cordoba (1997 and 1999); Corrientes (1991 and 1996); Salta (1998 and 
2002); Cartagena (1994 and 2002); San Pedro Sula (2000 and 2002); and Mexico City (1992 and 1998). 
Source: Case Studies, See Appendix 1.                                                                                                                                             11 
 
 
receiving piped water from the system prior to regularization.  In some of the other cases, for 
example in Cartagena, Colombia and Conakry, Guinea, the investment was financed through 
loans from the World Bank.  In this respect the increase in connections in these cases is not a 
direct result of the introduction of private sector participation.  However, it is important to note 
that the governments of these countries would probably not have received any money from the 
World Bank in the absence of private sector participation – in both cases the poor performance of 
the public enterprises operating prior to reform and the non-transparent institutional environment 
would have apparently ruled out World Bank support under continued public ownership.
15   
In Côte d’Ivoire, the expansion following the 1987 reform, which gave the private 
operator responsibility for planning and implementing most sector investment (from a special 
government fund financed through the tariff), was not the result of loans from international 
organizations.  In fact, whereas most investment before 1987 had been financed through 
borrowing from commercial banks and institutional financial institutions, the government 
decided that investment after 1987 should be financed from sector resources (i.e., through 
tariffs).  Consequently, the large (and accelerated) increase in coverage occurred despite a large 
reduction in the resources available for investment.
16  The increase, therefore, appears to be due 
to a reallocation of investment resources from increasing productive capacity towards expanding 
coverage after the private operator gained control over sector resources. 
 
Productivity 
In general, it is difficult to compare productivity across countries due to problems related 
to making international comparisons regarding valuing capital and output.  One simple measure 
of productivity that can be compared across countries without making assumptions regarding 
exchange rates is the number of workers per 1000 connections.  Although differences in factor 
prices and appropriate factor intensities means that comparisons between countries should be 
made carefully, it is probably easier to make comparisons within countries, across time.  Based 
upon this measure, it seems that productivity generally improved following the introduction (or 
expansion) of private sector participation. In all cases where data were available, the number of 
                                                 
15 See the discussion of Guinea in Clarke, Ménard and Zuluaga (2002) and Cartagena in Nickson (2001b). 
16 See Ménard and Clarke (2002a).                                                                                                                                             12 
 
 
workers per 1000 connections fell following the introduction of private sector participation (see 
Figure 2) 
 
It is important to note that this does not appear to be simply due to the private operator 
reducing the size of the workforce.  First, as noted previously, the introduction of private sector 
participation was generally associated with an increase in coverage and, therefore, the ratio could 
fall without a decrease in the number of employees (see, e.g., the case of Gabon, described in 
Trémolet and Neale 2002).  However, in many of the case studies, there were significant 
reductions in the number of employees.  Furthermore, even when the total number of employees 
stayed about the same in the medium-term, there were often significant workforce reductions 
(often through voluntary agreements with workers) following the reform (see, e.g., the case of 
Guinea, described in Ménard and Clarke 2002b).  That is, even if the private managers want 
roughly the same number of employees after reform as were in place before reform, they may 
want to realign the workforce in other ways (e.g., hiring more workers in commercial areas and 
reducing the number of engineers or technicians).  Consequently, even if reform results in an 

















Honduras (San Pedro Sul
Mexico (Mexico City
Before After
See Figure 1 for relevant years. 
Source: Case Studies, See Table 1.                                                                                                                                             13 
 
 




Despite the improvement in productivity associated with the introduction of private 
participation found in most of the case studies, prices often increased following reform. For 
example, in Chile, water and sewerage rates increased 40 percent for privatized utilities 
compared to only about 20 percent for non-privatized utilities (Bitran and Valenzuela 2003).  
Although this might seem puzzling given that productivity appears to have increased in most 
cases, this is probably not surprising given that water prices have often been set below cost in 
developing countries (World Bank 1994).   
Further, for several reasons, the “headline” price changes announced at the time of 
privatization might not reflect the true medium-term effect of reform on prices.  First, since 
prices are often adjusted frequently following the introduction of private participation, often 
during contract renegotiations, it is difficult to assess the medium-term effects of reform in the 
absence of detailed information on the price changes that would have occurred under public 
ownership.  Second, private participation is often associated with other changes that affect the 
amounts that consumers pay – metering often increases, the tariff structure is often revised, and 
houses are often billed differently.  These changes affect the actual price that consumers pay and 
make it very difficult to compare pre- and post-reform prices. 
In Buenos Aires, for example, households paid a fixed fee based upon various factors 
such as the size of the property and whether the property was residential or nonresidential.   
Although the complicated structure was retained following the introduction of private 
participation, the private company reclassified about 11 percent of ‘residential’ properties as 
‘non-residential’ and corrected the reported size of built areas for others.  This resulted in fee 
increases for about 425,000 of the utility’s 2.5 million customers.  Given that private operators 
have a strong incentive to increase revenues, it seems plausible that many of these changes will 
increase consumer prices.  Finally, informal connections are often regularized, increasing prices 
for these users.  Since these users already received service (although possibly an inferior level of 
service), the effective price that they pay for this service will be higher after regularization.  In 
summary, although it is difficult to estimate the effect that these factors have on prices, even in                                                                                                                                             14 
 
 
individual cases, it seems plausible that headline price changes will usually underestimate the 
true impact of private sector participation on prices. 
There does not appear to be an easy way of handling tariff increases.  For example, 
raising the price at (or close to) the time when private sector participation is introduced appears 
to have contributed to several contract cancellations (e.g., in Cochabamba, Bolivia and Tucumán, 
Argentina).  This has led some observers to suggest that it is better to raise prices before the 
introduction of PSP (see, e.g., Nickson and Vargas 2002).  On the other hand, although raising 
prices before introducing PSP might reduce public opposition to PSP per se, it also might focus 
public opposition to PSP and stop reform before it even starts (consider, for example, the failed 
reform in Pune, India – see Appendix 1).   
Another possible solution is to raise prices slowly over time, allowing the private 
operator to improve and expand service before having to raise prices and allowing customers to 
adapt to higher prices slowly.  This approach, however, has some drawbacks.  Most notably, one 
of the main political motivations for introducing private sector participation is to reduce the cost 
that the water utility imposes on the state budget and also to provide resources for system 
expansion.  That is, the extent and speed of improvements in coverage and quality might depend 
upon resources being quickly available for investment and maintenance – something that is more 
likely if tariffs were raised at the time of reform.  Further, private investors might not find 
government promises of subsidies credible – especially given that many governments in low-
income countries fail to pay even for their own water consumption. 
 
Water and Service Quality 
In addition to efficiency, coverage, and prices, an additional aspect of water and sewerage 
is the health externalities associated with these services. Although most case studies do not 
explicitly look at the effect of private participation on health outcomes, there are at least two 
reasons to expect that they might improve. First, as discussed above, private participation is often 
associated with increased coverage. Given that piped water is associated with improved health 
(in terms of diarrhea, child height, and child weight) (Esrey 1996, Jalan and Ravillion 2001), it 
seems likely that private participation has improved performance along these dimensions. 
Further, although few case studies provide detailed information on water quality, most suggest 
that it improved and some (e.g., studies in Salta, Argentina and Conakry, Guinea) show that                                                                                                                                             15 
 
 
physical, chemical, and bacterial quality improved following privatization.  One area where there 
was little consistent evidence of improved performance is unaccounted-for water. This might 
partially reflect the poor information on unaccounted-for water in many publicly operated 
systems. Unless the public operator meters consumption, it is very difficult to know how large a 
problem unaccounted-for water was before reform. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
As discussed above, there is very little empirical analysis of the effects of PSP in the 
water sector in developing countries.  In this section we use household-level data from three 
countries in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil) to assess the effects of PSP on water 
and sewerage connections. 
Our approach has several advantages over the existing literature:   
•  The household surveys (described in more detail below) are conducted in a fairly 
consistent manner and ask very similar questions across countries. 
•  The surveys are conducted over multiple years, allowing us to create datasets that 
include information on single utilities before and after privatization. 
•  The surveys ask questions about water and sewerage access, allowing us to explore 
the effects of privatization on both utilities, rather than only on water as most studies 
are forced to do. 
•  Because these surveys are conducted in many cities across each country, we also 
include data from cities that did not privatize their water systems, allowing us to 
include control groups for comparison. 
•  The surveys contain information on household education and income, allowing us to 
explore the effects of privatization on the poor and disadvantaged households. 
While the data offer great improvements over other datasets, they have some 
shortcomings.  In particular, they have no information on household spending on water and 
sewerage services, meaning that we cannot assess the effects of price changes.  They also do not 
provide any information on the efficiency of the water company (e.g., labor productivity or 
unaccounted-for-water).  The implication of this is that while we can look at the effects of 
privatization on coverage over time and compared to cities that did not privatize, it is impossible                                                                                                                                             16 
 
 
to derive welfare changes from these data.  In the next sub-sections we discuss the data, how we 
analyze it, and the results. 
 
Data and Analysis 
Our objective was to assemble a dataset that would allow us to assess household access to 
piped water and sewerage.  Throughout the 1990s many Latin American countries participated in 
an initiative to conduct multi-year household-level surveys.
17  During the same time period, 
many municipalities in Latin American countries introduced PSP in water supply and sewerage. 
Appendix 2 describes in detail how we put together our dataset and the assumptions and 
choices we had to make in order to assemble it.  Essentially, though, we had two primary data 
challenges.  First, we identified municipalities that introduced PSP and matched those to the 
surveys that would provide us with data from before and after the privatization.  To ensure useful 
comparisons, we chose countries where we could have, at a minimum, data from one year 
before, and two to five years after privatization.  Second, the original survey data had to be 
constructed so that it was possible to identify relatively small geographic regions in order to 
capture areas affected by PSP. 
These fairly stringent criteria left us with a rather short list of countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Brazil.  While this is a small number of countries, however, multiple cities and 
provinces in each country introduced PSP.  Moreover, within each of these countries we matched 
cities and provinces that introduced PSP to “control” cities and provinces—areas that retained 
public ownership of their water systems—where possible.  We matched regions based on 
population, as that variable was the most widely available at the relevant geographic levels. 
In addition to access overall, we are interested in the effects of PSP on access by the 
poor.  We used two measures to identify poor households: education of the household head and 
income.  While household income is probably the best way to identify poor households, not all 
respondents report this information.  Education, which is typically correlated with income, 
                                                 
17 This initiative, the Programa para el Mejoramiento de las Encuestas y la Medición de las Condiciones de Vida en 
América Latina y el Caribe (the Program for the Betterment of Surveys and the Measurement of the Living 
Conditions of Latin America and the Caribbean, or MECOVI), is a joint initiative of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  Its central objective is to aid Latin American countries 
in generating adequate and high quality information regarding living conditions.                                                                                                                                             17 
 
 
simply provides an additional window on the effects of PSP by socioeconomic status.  Appendix 
2 explains how we defined these variables for each country.  
For each city and year we identified the share of households with access to piped water 
and the share of households with flush toilets.
18  To evaluate the distributional effects, we also 
identified the share of households with low incomes and heads with little education.  The exact 
definitions of “low incomes” and “little education” that we used varied somewhat across 
countries due to the fact that small sample sizes in smaller cities made certain comparisons 
impossible.  We explain each definition more carefully when we discuss the results by country, 
below. 
Our final dataset has information from 18 cities that introduced some form of PSP in the 
1990s, and 28 controls cities that never privatized.  For Argentina we have survey data for 1995, 
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002; for Bolivia 1995, 1999, and 2001; and for Brazil 1995 and 2001.  
Table 1 lists the cities, the year of PSP, and provides a brief description of the PSP arrangement.  
Table 2 shows all cities we identified, including the controls, and their populations.  It is 
important to emphasize that an observation in the dataset is a city-year, and a variable is the 
share of households in that city reporting that they have water and sewerage access (access to 
infrastructure overall, access to infrastructure by education and income). 
To evaluate the effects of PSP on water and sewerage access we compared access before 
and after privatization in each city and relative to access in cities that retained public control of 
their water and sewerage utilities.  We discuss the results below. 
 
Results: Graphs by Country 
The results, in general, are fairly consistent across the three countries.  Access to both 
water and sewerage tended to improve in areas with PSP following privatization, consistent with 
the case study literature discussed above.  However, access in cities that retained public 
ownership also tended to improve over those same years.  Although access fell in some cities 
over the periods that we studied, this does not necessarily imply that the total number of 
connections fell – urban population was growing in many of the cities in our sample and, 
                                                 
18   More accurately, we consider a household to have a flush toilet—and thus sewerage services—if the household 
has drainage to a “public network or sewer” in Argentina, to the sewer in Bolivia, and to a “sewerage network OR 
septic tank linked to sewage collection” in Brazil.                                                                                                                                             18 
 
 
therefore, the number of connections needed to increase just to keep pace with population 
growth.
19 
The results concerning coverage also hold across socioeconomic lines: access by the 
poorest households tended to improve or remain relatively constant following the introduction of 
PSP.  However, changes in coverage for poor households did not appear any different in areas 
with PSP than it did in those with public access.  Still, each country presented unique challenges 
in aggregating the data for analysis while discarding as little information as possible. 
 
Brazil 
Brazil yielded the simplest data.  Here we identified two regions, one a province and the 
other its capital city, that introduced PSP. Both regions entered into joint ownership agreements 
in 1998.  Eleven cities and provinces served as controls.  Household surveys conducted in 1995 
and 2001 provided us information from several years before and several years after PSP.  We 
averaged the access figures from the two areas that entered into joint ventures, and also averaged 
the access figures for our control areas. 
                                                 
19  Between 1995 and 2001, piped water coverage decreased by more than 2 percent in 3 Bolivian cities in the 
dataset:  Oruro, Sucre, and Trinidad.  Between 1992 and 2001, the Bolivian population grew nearly 29%.  In Oruro, 
population growth was only 9.71%, but Sucre and Trinidad saw population growth of more than 47% and 31%, 
respectively.  Drops in water coverage, at least in the latter two cities, may reflect the failure of connection growth to 
keep pace with population growth. 
Between 1995 and 2001 (1999-2001 in Argentina), the sewerage coverage of 7 cities decreased by more than 2 
percent.  In 2 of those cities, population growth resembled the national average (11% in Argentina and 29% in 
Bolivia).  In the remaining 5, it was above average: roughly 40% above average in 1 city (Parana), 75% in another 
(Tarija), 100% in 2 cities (Santiago del Estero and Gran Resistencia) and 150% above average in the fifth 
(Catamarca).  Drops in sewerage coverage may reflect a failure of connection growth to keep pace with population 




Figure 3 compares household access to piped water before and after entering into the 
joint ventures, and compares that performance to the control areas.  The Figure reveals that 
access, already fairly high, improved somewhat following the introduction of the private sector.  
It is also clear, however, that access to piped water in the control areas, which was lower than in 
the areas that would ultimately experience PSP, improved by more than coverage in the areas 
that introduced PSP.  Access to piped water by the poor, meanwhile, seemed to improve fairly 
substantially in both the areas that introduced PSP and in the control areas. 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 shows the similar analysis for access to flush toilets.  The general picture here is 
the same: access improved under PSP and under public provision.  In this case, however, the 
sewerage gains under PSP appear to be better both overall and for the poor, who saw access rates 
more than double while poor households in the control areas saw only minor improvements. 
 
Bolivia 
Three cities in our sample in Bolivia introduced PSP in the water and sewerage sectors: 
La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba.  La Paz and El Alto, however, were privatized in 1997 under 
the same concession agreement and thus we treat them as a single city (La Paz/ El Alto).  The 
government of Cochabamba entered into a 40-year concession agreement in 1999, but it was 
cancelled five months later after civil unrest erupted in response to tariff increases.  Household 
surveys were conducted in 1995, 1999, and 2001.  These data allow us to see the before-after 
comparison for La Paz/El Alto, and compare it to control cities and the failed privatization in 
Cochabamba. 
Figure 4  
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Figure 5 shows household access to piped water in La Paz/ El Alto, Cochabamba, and our 
control cities for 1995, 1999, and 2001.  We use education as a proxy for income, as the small 
sample size made income comparisons impossible.  The figure shows a general improvement in 
the late 1990s in all cities followed by modest declines in coverage between 1999 and 2001.  
There is no evidence that La Paz / El Alto fared particularly better or worse than did the other 
cities. 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 shows access to sewerage.  This figure demonstrates first that at least in one 
respect La Paz / El Alto was in better shape prior to its privatization than were the other cities.  
Gains in overall sewerage access seemed to continue following Cochabamba’s failed 
privatization, but poorer people lost ground after the cancellation, both in absolute terms and 
relative to other cities in Bolivia. 
 
Argentina 
Among Latin American countries, probably Argentina most actively embraced private 
sector participation across all major sectors of the economy.  Water was no exception.  In our 
sample we identified 13 cities and provinces that introduced PSP.  While it was impossible to 
match some of the cities—such as Buenos Aires—to a control group because of population 
disparities between areas with PSP and control areas, we were nonetheless able to identify six 
controls to match to the smaller cities. 
Figure 6 
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Our household data comes from surveys conducted in 1995, 1999, 2001, and 2002.
20  
Privatizations, meanwhile, began in 1991 (Corrientes was the first city in our sample to privatize) 
and continued until 2002 (when La Rioja privatized).  Our data allow us, therefore, to look at 
access from 1995 – 2002 for cities that privatized before that time period and thus were privately 
run throughout; at the very beginning of the time period (1995); sometime during the time 
period—and thus allowing a before-after comparison; one city that privatized at the end; and 
cities that never privatized.  For simplicity, we aggregated data from cities that privatized in the 
same time period, except for Gran Buenos Aires and Buenos Aires province, which are each too 
large to meaningfully combine with other regions.  
Figure 7 shows urban access to piped water in cities throughout Argentina.  Most striking 
is the near universal coverage of piped water in all of these cities.  With a few exceptions, the 
changes over the time period are too small for us to rule out sampling error. 
 
The exceptions include Posadas, privatized in 1999, and possibly the cities privatized in 
1995 (Santa Fe-Rosario and Formosa), Tucumán, and the control cities.  Posadas experienced a 
large jump from about 82 percent coverage in 1995 to 97 percent coverage by 1999.  Because 
Posadas was privatized in 1999 it is difficult to attribute this improvement to the privatization 
                                                 
20  We do not present the 2001 data here, as it does not differ substantially from 2002.  We do, however, include that 
Figure 7 
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itself, but it may have resulted from improvements in anticipation of privatization (perhaps in 
order to make the concession more attractive).  Moreover, the cities that saw some improvement 
did not, with the exception of Posadas, seem to improve by more than did the cities that retained 
public control of their water systems. 
Figure 8 shows access to piped water by households in the bottom income quintile.  This 
sample suffers from a relatively small sample size in some cities, as is evident by the few cases 
of 100 percent coverage.  Nonetheless, the figure still demonstrates that even poor households in 
these cities in Argentina had relatively good access to piped water.  The general trends here are 
the same as in the aggregate, with some improvements over time, but not generally better in 
cities with PSP than in cities with public water systems. 
 
Our sewerage data are not quite as comprehensive.  The household surveys did not 
contain questions regarding sewerage connections in 1995, eliminating our earliest time period.  
The result is that we have true before-after data only for one city, Catamarca, which privatized its 
water system in 2000.  Figure 9 shows the aggregate sewerage connection data.  The figure 
                                                                                                                                                             
data in the econometric analysis below. 
Figure 8 
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demonstrates that sewerage coverage is, in general, not nearly as widespread as is piped water.  It 
also demonstrates overall very little change between 1999 and 2002.  The figure shows small 
increases in coverage in Buenos Aires (province) and Posadas, which both privatized in 1999, 
and a small decrease in coverage in Catamarca.  Connections in the control cities increased 
slightly. 
 
Access to sewerage remained relatively constant among households in the poorest 
income quintile, as well, with a few exceptions.  Catamarca saw a substantial decrease in 
connections after privatization, while La Rioja saw a fair increase in connections prior to 
privatization.  Connections in control cities increased slightly among the poor. 
Figure 9 
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Results: Empirical Analysis 
The figures presented above are suggestive, but the data allow us to go a step further and 
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An observation is a city- (or region-) year.  The dependent variable is as described above: the 
share of the urban population with piped water and sewerage connections.  Private is a dummy 
variable indicating private sector participation.  Population is the population of the city 
according to census data closest in time to the year t.
21  Income is the country-level per-capita 
GDP (in constant 1995 dollars) in the survey year.  Control is a dummy variable indicating that 
                                                 
21   City or province population are not available for all places in all years.   
Figure 10 
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the city or region retained public ownership of the system.  We add variables slowly as we 
estimate the equations to see how controlling for various factors affects the results.   
  Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (1).  The first column of the table shows 
that privatization is positively and significantly correlated with piped water coverage when 
controlling only for population and income.  Including year dummies causes the estimate to 
become statistically insignificant and smaller in magnitude, though it remains positive.  Adding 
in the control dummy variable, however, changes the results quite a bit.  The coefficient on 
private turns negative, though it remains statistically insignificant. 
  In the final column of the table we test whether the type of privatization contract matters.  
In Bolivia and Argentina PSP involved concessions, but in Brazil PSP involved joint ownership.  
We find a negative coefficient on the concession dummy variable and a positive coefficient on 
the joint ownership variable, though neither comes close to being statistically significant.  It is 
not clear, however, whether the lack of significance is due to a true lack of correlation or whether 
it is due to the relatively small sample size (i.e., we have only four observations of joint 
ownership). 
22 
  Table 4 shows the results from estimating equation (2) in the same manner as described 
for equation (1).  The results are essentially identical: PSP is positively and significantly 
correlated with coverage until one controls also for time trends and compares to cities that never 
privatized.  In the presence of these controls, the analysis does not reveal any statistically 
significant correlation between private sector participation and coverage rates. 
 
4. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
The existing evidence on the effects of privatization in the water sector is spotty, at best.  
In general, cross-country empirical studies have been fairly inconclusive and single-utility case 
studies tend to find improvements, especially in the number of connections and labor 
productivity.  We use data from household-level surveys to generate consistent, comparable data 
across countries and municipalities to examine the evidence on coverage in greater detail.  These 
                                                 
22  The results are robust to including or excluding Buenos Aires from the analysis.                                                                                                                                             28 
 
 
data allow us to explore connection rates for piped water and sewerage before and after PSP and 
to compare those rates to comparable cities that did not introduce PSP. 
With respect to coverage, our results are broadly consistent with the existing case study 
literature; we find that piped water and sewerage coverage generally increased following the 
introduction of private sector participation.  However, coverage also improved in cities that did 
not introduce PSP and, consequently, there is little evidence that PSP itself improved coverage.  
Because case studies do not consider cities other than the one under investigation, they may 
mistakenly attribute better coverage to PSP without considering what was likely to happen in the 
absence of PSP.   
On the other hand, although we do not find that PSP improves coverage, we also do not 
find strong evidence that the poor were significantly harmed by privatization, at least in this 
respect.  Just as in the aggregate, trends in connection rates for poor households were similar in 
cities that did and did not introduce PSP. 
Although these results suggest that PSP did not directly improve coverage, they are also 
consistent with an alternate hypothesis: that benchmark competition with private utilities 
encourages utilities that remain publicly owned to improve their own performance.  Research on 
telecommunications suggests that introducing real competition, rather than privatization, is 
mostly responsible for the improvements observed in the sector in recent years.  Introducing 
competition in the water sector, however, is difficult as discussed above.  In these cases, it is 
possible that competitive pressures could come from firms competing for concessions 
(competition for the market) or from popular pressure for residents served by public companies 
for their water system to perform as well as their neighbors’ systems (benchmark competition). 
There is little evidence that competition for the market has been successful in developing 
countries.  A first problem is that there are often very few bidders for many contracts, partly 
reflecting the fact that several large private firms dominate private sector participation in water 
and sewerage (see Silva, et al. 1998).  An additional problem associated with competition for the 
market is that many contracts—up to two-thirds in Latin America—are renegotiated following 
the introduction of private sector participation.  The high number of renegotiations, while 
perhaps not surprising may suggest that there is a strong potential for strategic behavior when 
bidding for contracts; firms can bid with the expectation that they will be able to renegotiate 
unfavorable contract provisions after they have won the contract.  For example, in cases where                                                                                                                                             29 
 
 
contracts were bid on price, price reductions have often been quickly eroded during contract 
renegotiations (e.g., in Buenos Aires and Tucumán). 
It is possible, however, that our data demonstrate the effect of benchmark competition.  
As one city reforms its water systems, other cities feel pressure to similarly reform.  In this case, 
one might expect to see comparable changes among cities that privatized and cities that did not.  
This hypothesis, though, even if true, demonstrates potential benefits of competition and not of 
privatization, per se.  Moreover, it does not explain why benchmark competition between cities 
was not a potent force prior to privatization. 
While our information on connection rates is more comprehensive than most existing 
studies, we lack enough information to make more definitive statements about the effects of 
privatization on consumers.  In particular, we currently have no information on tariffs or on what 
households pay for water or sewerage.  We also do not know whether connections to the water 
system are formal, illegal, or metered, and we do not know whether that status changed with 
privatization.  Further, as in most case studies, we do not have any information on direct or 
indirect subsidies before or after privatization.  Absent such information, we cannot estimate the  
welfare effects of reform. 
Such additional information would be important to uncover given that one of the most 
difficult issues with which reform must contend is that of tariffs.  In many countries, tariffs were 
set well below nearly any measure of long-run cost prior to reform.  Therefore, they often had to 
be increased, even after the gains in productivity that are evident in the case study literature are 
taken into account.  This has proven to be extremely unpopular – notwithstanding contingent 
valuations surveys that suggest that people are often willing to pay high tariffs for improved 
service and water quality – and appears to have been one of the main problems in the most 
notorious contract cancellations (see Appendix 1).
23   
In summary, water privatization has proven to be especially controversial and difficult.  
To date there has been little empirical work evaluating its effects.  We use household-level data 
to explore the effect on water and sewerage coverage over time (before and after privatization) 
                                                 
23 Even when contracts have not been cancelled, tariff increases have often been controversial.  In Guinea, for 
example, a lease contract was not renewed after it expired, primarily due to discontent that resulted from the large 
tariff increase that followed the introduction of private sector participation.  This occurred despite the fact that most 
performance indicators in Guinea improved following the introduction of private sector participation – in particular, 
coverage increased and service and water quality improved.                                                                                                                                             30 
 
 
and across cities, including compared to control cities that never privatized.  While connections 
appear to have generally increased following privatization, the increases appear to be about the 
same as in cities that retained public ownership of their water systems.  In other words, the 
analysis provides little evidence that privatization itself generated improvements in access.   
However, contrary to fears, there is also no evidence that the poor served by privatized firms are 



































24  Description of Private Sector Involvement 
Gran Buenos Aires, 
Argentina (city) 
1993   In 1993, local authorities of the city of Gran Buenos Aires, granted a 30-
year concession of water and sanitation services to the private firm 
Aguas Argentinas.  The contract was bid based upon the price reduction 





1999 2002  The local water operation of the province of Buenos Aires was 
purchased in 1999 for US$430m by Azurix, an international subsidiary 
of Enron (US). In October 2001, the now-bankrupt US energy company 
announced that it would withdraw from the contract as of January 2002.  
The provincial government took over the firm through state-owned 
Aguas Bonaerenses (EIU). 
Gran Cordoba, 
Argentina (city) 
1997   In 1997, the provincial government of Cordoba signed a 30-year 
connection contract with Aguas Cordobesas, a private company owned 
by Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and domestic investors.  The concession 
contract was for water services only (and did not include sanitation). 
Santa Fe-Rosario, 
Argentina (cities) 
1995   In 1995, the provincial government of Santa Fe granted a 30-year 
concession to Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe, a private consortium of 
which Suez Lyonnaise de Eaux owned just over 50%. 
Tucumán, 
Argentina (city) 
1995 1997  In 1995, the provincial government of Tucumán granted Aguas del 
Aconquija SA (CAA), a subsidiary of Vivendi, a 30-year concession to 
supply water and sanitation services.  The privatization contract was 
awarded through competitive bidding to the company that agreed to 
allow the largest price reductions, subject to management and 
investment requirements set by the provincial government.  Problems 
quickly developed, however, and in 1997, the contract was rescinded. 
Salta, Argentina 
(city) 
1998   In 1998, Salta granted NECON, S.A. a 30-year, exclusive concession to 
provide water and sewerage services.  Prior to privatization, the General 
Administration of Water of Salta (AGAS) served 43 localities, while the 
remainder of the population (some 25,000 of a 1997 total population of 
1,000,983) relied on cooperatives and other sources.   
Santiago del Estero 
-La Banda, 
Argentina (cities) 
1997   In 1997, the provincial government of Santiago del Estero awarded a 
concession of water and sanitation services to Aguas de Santiago, S.A., 
a private consortium comprised of several Argentine firms. 
Posadas, Argentina 
(city) 
1999   In 1999, the provincial government of Misiones awarded a 30-year 
concession contract for the provision of water and sanitation services to 
Servicios de Aguas de Misiones S.A. (SAMSA).  The private water 
company belongs (90%) to the Spanish group Dragados.  Dragados’ 
subsidiary, Urbaser S.A., provides the company’s management services. 
Corrientes, 
Argentina (city) 
1991   In 1991, the provincial government of Corrientes became the first 
provincial government in Argentina to award a concession contract in 
the water sector.  As for most subsequent Argentine concession 
contracts, the contract was awarded to the company that agreed to 
charge the lowest price (i.e., bidding was over average service price).  
The government awarded a 30-year concession to Aguas de Corrientes, 




1995   In 1995, the provincial government of Formosa awarded a concession of 
water and sanitation services to Aguas de Formosa, a private consortium 
of which SAGUA Internacional S.A., an Argentine corporation, owned 
80%.  The province retained 10% of the company’s shares. 
                                                 
24 If cancelled during or before the last year of survey data for that country (2002 for Argentina, 2001 for Bolivia, 









24  Description of Private Sector Involvement 
Catamarca, 
Argentina (city) 
2000   In 2000, the provincial government of Catamarca privatized the 
province’s water and sanitation company, Obras Sanitarias de 
Catamarca (OSCA).  The government awarded a 30-year concession 
contract to FCC and Vivendi joint subsidiary Proactiva Medio 
Ambiente.  Proactiva won the concession after bidding to pay 12.5% of 
annual billing to the provincial government. 
Gran Mendoza, 
Argentina (city) 
1998   In 1998, the provincial government of Mendoza granted a 25-year 
concession to Obras Sanitarias Mendoza S.A., a private consortium 
comprised of American, Argentina, and French corporations.  The 
province retained 20% of the shares in the water company. 
La Rioja, Argentina 
(city) 
2002   In 1999, the provincial government of La Rioja awarded a contract to 
Latin Aguas to manage the public water and sanitation utility, Aguas de 
la Rioja.  In the first six months of the management contract, Latin 
Aguas increased water supply from 6 to 24 hours per day, reduced 
operating costs by 40%, and increased the collection rate from 10-12% 
to 80%.  In 2002, the government awarded Latin Aguas a 30-year 
concession in water and sanitation.  Latin Aguas also holds operating 
concessions in the provinces of Salta and Corrientes 
La Paz and El Alto, 
Bolivia (cities) 
1997   In 1997 the Bolivian government awarded a water and sanitation 
concession contract to the private consortium Aguas del Illimani, led by 
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux.  It was the first major concession contract in 
Bolivia.  In contrast to other concession contracts (e.g., the Buenos 
Aires concession contract), bidding was conducted over coverage targets 
rather than tariff reductions.  The concessionaire committed to 




1999   In 1999, the government signed a 40-year concession contract with 
Aguas del Tunari (AdT).  Included in the contract was a guarantee to the 
operator of profitability.  Five months after the concession was granted, 
the population rioted against water tariff increases and the contract was 
cancelled because of pervasive civil disorder (thus returning to the 




(capital city of 
Parana) 
1998   In 1998, the state government of Parana sold 38% of the shares in 
Sanepar, the public water and sanitation utility, to a private consortium 
of which Vivendi held 30%.  The consortium power over staffing, loans, 
deals with shareholders, and final say over tariffs.  The IFC as well as 
other international organizations provided assistance.  In 2003, the state 
governor stripped the consortium of its voting rights and announced 



















  Areas of Private Sector Participation  Public Sector, Control Areas 




to Year of PSP 
Control Regions 
(Public)  Population 
Gran Buenos Aires (city)  1993  1991: 10,934,727     
Buenos Aires (province)  1999-
2002 
2001: 5,458,449     
Gran Cordoba (city)  1997  2001: 1,261,000     
Santa Fe-Rosario (cities)  1995  1991: 1,260,781     
Tucuman (city)  1995-
1997 
1991: 470,809     
Salta (city)  1998  2001: 465,000     
Santiago del Estero-La Banda 
(cities) 
1997  2001: 318,000  Gran Resistencia (city)  1991: 229,212      
2001: 281,000 
Posadas (city)  1999  2001: 262,000  Jujuy-Palpala (cities) 
 
1991: 218,570      
2001: 274,000   
Corrientes (city)  1991  1991: 258,103  Parana (city)  1991: 207,041      
2001: 240,000 
Formosa (city)  1995  1991: 147,636  Neuquen (city)  1991: 167,296    
2001: 199,000 
Catamarca (city)  2000  2001: 141,000  Comodoro Rivadavia (city)  1991: 124,104      
2001: 138,000 
Gran Mendoza (city)  1998  2001: 111,000  San Juan (city)  1991: 119,423    
2001: 113,000 
San Luis (city)  2000  2001: 154,000     
Argentina 
La Rioja (city)  2002  2001: 143,000     
La Paz and El Alto (cities)  1997  2001: 1,436,935  Santa Cruz (city)  1992: 697,278     
2001: 1,116,059 
Cochabamba (city)  1999  2001: 516,683  Oruro (city)  1992: 183,422      
2001: 201,230 
      Sucre (city)  1992: 131,769    
 2001: 193,873 
      Tarija (city)  1992: 90,113     
2001: 135,783 









      Trinidad (city)  1992: 57,328    
2001: 75,540 
      Rio de Janeiro (province)  1991: 11,291,520    
2000: 14,367,083 
      Bahia (province)  1991: 11,867,991     
2000: 13,066,910 
      Sao Paulo (city)  1991: 9,412,894    
2000: 10,405,867 
Parana (province)  1998-
2003 
2000: 9,558,454  Rio Grande do Sul (province)  1991: 9,138,670    
2000: 10,181,749 
      Pernambuco (province)  1991: 7,127,855    
2000: 7,911,937 
      Ceara (province)  1991: 6,366,647   
 2000: 7,418,476 
      Para (province)  1991: 4,950,060    
2000: 6,189,550 
      Rio de Janeiro (city)  1991: 5,480,768    
2000: 5,851,914 
      Maranhao (province)  1991: 4,930,253   
 2000: 5,642,960 
      Santa Catarina (province)  1991: 4,541,994    
2000: 5,349,580 
Brazil  
      Salvador (city)  1991: 2,073,510    
2000: 2,440,828                                                                                                                                             34 
 
 
      Belo Horizonte (city)  1991: 2,013,257   
 2000: 2,232,747 
      Fortaleza (city)  1991: 1,768,637    
2000: 2,138,234 
Curitiba (city)  1998-
2003 
2000: 1,586,848  Recife (city)  1991: 1,298,229   
 2000: 1,421,993 
      Porto Alegre (city)  1991: 1,247,529    
2000: 1,360,033 
 
      Belem (city)  1991: 849,187   














Piped Water and Private Participation
Dependent variable: share of urban households with
                             piped water connections
Constant 86.663 88.532 92.875 94.442
(46.70)*** (29.49)*** (23.52)*** (25.12)***
private 2.970 1.117 -2.225
(1.98)** (0.72) (0.88)
   concession -2.333
(0.92)
   joint ownership 1.618
(0.25)
control (always public) -4.004 -3.917
(1.68)* (1.64)
city/region population -0.424 -0.324 -0.280 -0.293
(2.08)** (1.59) (1.37) (1.42)
gdp per capita 1.217 1.142 1.013 1.032
(4.02)*** (3.72)*** (3.22)*** (3.26)***
year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 158 158 158 158
R-squared 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.28
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses





Sewerage and Private Participation
Dependent variable: share of urban households with
                             inside flush toilets
Constant 62.959 71.684 79.315 79.210
(13.64)*** (8.63)*** (7.02)*** (6.98)***
private 8.316 5.723 -1.092
(2.06)** (1.35) (0.14)
   concession -1.254
(0.15)
   joint ownership 3.328
(0.19)
control (always public) -7.645 -7.554
(1.00) (0.98)
city/region population -1.724 -1.403 -1.349 -1.366
(3.28)*** (2.53)** (2.42)** (2.43)**
gdp per capita 0.586 -0.150 -0.272 -0.246
(0.74) (0.17) (0.30) (0.27)
year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 140 140 140 140
R-squared 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.17
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                                                                                                                                              36 
 
 
Table A1:  Effect of Reforms Involving Private Sector Participation on Sector Performance, Qualitative Assessments in Case 
Studies. 







Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Africa 
Côte d’Ivoire (All)  1988
a 2000  Lease 
Positive 
 
In contrast to water utilities elsewhere in Africa, the private sector has played 
a significant role in the water sector in Côte d’Ivoire for over 40 years.  
However, the role of the private operator has changed several times over this 
period.  The most recent significant reform was in 1987, when the private 
operator gained greater control over investment resources, which were 
funded through a surtax on water sales, and was forced to assume greater 
commercial risk (i.e., contract provisions that compensated the operator if 
actual revenue fell short of projected revenue were eliminated).   
 
Overall, most assessments of the reform were positive.  In particular, after stagnating 
for several years before the reform was initiated, the number of connections 
increased significantly after the private operator assumed greater control over 
investment resources.  Furthermore, the operator continued to improve upon its 
already strong commercial and technical performance and prices slowly fell in real 
terms.  Despite the generally positive assessment of the reform, some observers have 
noted that some problems remain.  In particular, the private operator’s financial 
performance deteriorated following the recent political problems in Côte d’Ivoire.  
The economic problems that have resulted from the political events have contributed 
to a slowdown in investment and reduction in collection rates from both private and 
public customers.  The slowdown has also meant that the government has refused to 




Menard and Clarke (2002a) 
Trémolet, Browning and Howard 
(2002) 




In 1997, Gabon awarded the first true concession in the water sector in Africa to a 
private sector operator., who assumed responsibility for water and electricity in the 
country.  Tremolet and Neale (2002) report that the private operator improved service 
quality and coverage, while reducing tariffs – a 17.25 percent price reduction was 
enacted when the concession was implement.  The private operator made almost 40 
percent of the investment required under the 20-year contract in the first five years, 
outperforming its contractual coverage targets in most areas.  Trémolet (2002) notes 
that the rapid expansion of water coverage was in part due to cross-subsidization 
from the electricity sector.  Further, they note that delays in meeting the remaining 
targets were mainly due to delays in the government delivering on its planned 
investments.  They also note that the operator’s commercial performance was 
generally strong and that its financial performance had improved, reducing the cash 
flow problems that had been one of the motivations for reform.  However, they noted 
that the regulatory and monitoring tools needed to assess the overall performance of 
the company had not been put in place by 2002, especially outside of the main cities.  
Trémolet (2002) 
Trémolet and Neale (2002)                                                                                                                                             37 
 
 







Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Gambia (All)  1993  1995  Lease 
Negative.  Cancelled after implementation. 
 
After several failed attempts aimed at improving the performance of a publicly 
owned utility in Gambia, the government signed a lease contract with a private sector 
company, Management Services Gambia (MSG) that was mainly owned by SOGEA, 
a subsidiary of the French company Générale des Eaux (now Vivendi).  The private 
operator took control of the utility in July 1993.  At the same time, a public enterprise 
was set up to retain ownership of sector assets.  Although there were some 
improvements in performance following the introduction of private sector 
participation – most notably total production appears to have increased over the 
period of the lease, the number of connections improved and it appeared that system 
renewals completed during the period of the lease might have reduced unaccounted 
for water, these improvements were attributed to the World Bank supported Water 
Supply and Electricity Project rather than the lease contract per se (see, e.g., Kerf, 
2000, p. 21).   
 
In February 1995, less than a year and a half after the private operator took control, 
the government unilaterally revoked the contract.  This decision appears to have been 
due to political change following a 1994 coup, poor relations between the state 
company that controlled sector assets and the private company in charge of 
operations and maintenance, disagreements between the government and the private 
operator over contract provisions, and public discontent with private operations, in 
part due to the private operators campaign to disconnect non-payers (Kerf, 2000). 
Kerf (2000) 
Guinea (All)  1989  1999  Lease 
(10 year) 
Mixed, but mostly positive 
 
In general, most performance indicators improved following the introduction of 
private sector participation.  The number of connections increased significantly in 
Conakry and in the rest of the country.  Furthermore, the private operators 
commercial and technical performance was significantly stronger than the 
performance under public ownership – labor and total factor productivity improved 
significantly following the reform, the private operator rapidly metered households, 
businesses and government agencies, bill collection from private consumers 
improved and service and water quality improved significantly.  In a detailed cost-
benefit analysis, Clarke, Ménard and Zuluaga (2002) concluded that the total benefits 
of reform exceeded $33 million (in 1996 US$) between 1989 and 1999. 
 
However, it is important to note that the gains were achieved relative to the very 
weak initial conditions and that problems remained throughout the reform period.  In 
particular, prices increased significantly (over 400% in real terms) making piped 
water unaffordable for many low-income consumers.  The high price of water, in 
turn, meant that the number of connections remained very low even by regional 
standards.  Furthermore, the reform ultimately proved unsustainable.  After the lease 
expired in 1999, it was not renewed and the international enterprise withdrew from 
the country in 2001.  
Book Cowen (1999) 
Brook and Lucussol (2001) 
Clarke, Ménard and Zuluaga (2002) 
Kerf (2000) 
Ménard and Clarke (2002b) 
Rivera (1996)                                                                                                                                             38 
 
 







Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Senegal (All)  1996  2000  Lease 
Positive 
 
Although progress on some performance indicators (e.g., unaccounted-for-water and 
progress with some contractual works) has been more modest than was originally 
hoped for, most performance indicators improved following the introduction of 
private sector participation.  In particular, the number of connections increased quite 
significantly over the first five years of the contract – from about 204,000 in 1995 to 
close to 300,000 by 2001 – and productive capacity improved modestly.  
Furthermore, the operator managed to improve performance along several other 
dimensions.  For example, it increased billing efficiency, reduced unaccounted for 
water, improved water quality and reduced number of employees.  Finally, despite 
the modest price increases, low-income consumers appear to have benefited from 
reform.  In particular, Clarke and Wallsten (2002) note that the connection rate 
increased more quickly for households in Dakar headed by individuals with no 
formal education than it increased for other households. 
Kerf (2000) 
Trémolet, Browning and Howard 
(2002) 
World Bank (2001) 
South Africa 
(Queenstown)  1992 2000  Concession 
(25 Years 
Mixed (Modest Improvements) 
 
Description:  Concession Contract (25 years). In 1992, the municipality of 
Queenstown entered into a concession contract with Water Services of South Africa 
(WSSA – lead investor: Suez Lyonnaise).  The contract was for 15 years (later 
extended to 25).  The company was responsible for operations, maintenance and 
management of the systems.  However, billing and the collection remained the 
responsibilities of the municipality, as the legal system did not allow private sector 
involvement in these activities.  In 1995, when municipal boundaries changed to 
incorporate two new areas (Mlungisi and Ezibeleni), the contract was extended to 
cover the 170,000 new inhabitants—up from only 22,000 in 1992. 
 
Outcome:  Coverage was already universal when the contract was signed and, 
therefore, there was little expansion (other than to new low-income housing).  Due to 
contract restrictions, there were no layoffs.  Consequently, connections per worker 
did not improve.  However, there were some quality improvements: unaccounted for 
water fell from 45% to 21% by 2000, pipe bursts became less common and 65% of 
ageing water pipes in Mlungisi and Ezibelenii.  However, water bills increased for 
low-income consumers and nonpayment remains a problem in Mlungisi (55% in Jan 
2000) and Ezibeleni (56% in Jan 2000).   
Palmer Development Group (2000) 
Asia 
China 
(Macau)  1985 1998  Concession 
(25 Years) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
India 
(Pune)  1998 2000  Management 
Contract 
Negative.  Cancelled before implementation 
 
In 1998, the municipal government attempted to solicit bids for a contract that was 
intended to increase sector coverage and improve sector performance.  The contract 
contained three components: a fixed-price, fixed-time (36 month) construction 
contract that would extend and improve the water and sewerage networks, improve 
existing sewage treatment plants and construct a new water treatment plant; a five-
year operations and maintenance contract; and a five-year contract designed to 
improve billing and collection. The project would have resulted in substantial tariff 
increases (25% for water charges for domestic users and 43% for standpipe charges). 
After companies had been pre-qualified and had submitted bids, the municipal 
government cancelled the project a few weeks before the contract was going to be 
awarded.  Zérah (2000) argues that the cancellation was increase in opposition 
following local elections, the transfer of a district commissioner who had 
championed the reform, and growing concern about the cost of the project and the 
rate of return than private operators might get from the project especially after tariffs 
had been increased during project preparation. 
Zérah (2000) 
Malaysia 
(Johor Bahru)          
Philippines 
(Manila)  1997 2003 
Two 
Concessions 
(Both for 25 
years) 
Mixed.  One concession cancelled after implementation 
 
In response to a water crisis characterized by low coverage, unsustainably high UFW, 
poor management, and inadequate investment, Filipino authorities brokered the 
privatization of Manila’s Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) 
in 1997.  Although it would become the largest water concession in the world, 
feasibility studies recommended full, not partial, privatization.  The government 
divided the total service area into two zones and granted the Eastern zone to an 
Ayala/Bechtel consortium named Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) and the 
Western zone to a Benpres Holdings/Suez consortium named the Manila Water 
Company (MWC).  Each concession was granted for a period of 25 years, and 
MWSS became the sector regulator.  Included in the contracts was a JV agreement 
for common facilities and an interconnection agreement.    
 
In 1998, both corporations sought tariff increases despite a five-year freeze on prices 
laid out in each contract.  Although the contracts provided for “Extraordinary Price 
Adjustments” if the circumstances merited it, these tariff adjustments were to be 
spread over the length of the concession.  In response to the peso devaluation that 
resulted from the regional crisis of 1997, a 30% drop in water supply owing to El 
Niño effects, and unforeseen increases in capital costs, MWSI requested a sharp 
increase in tariffs in the first review rather than a gradual rise.  Although MWSS did 
increase tariffs, it did not approve the particular increases requested by MWSI.  
While the Manila concession improved service coverage and quality along many 
lines, MWSI never operated profitably, and the firm unilaterally terminated its 
contract in December of 2002.  MWSI claims that MWSS violated the terms of its 
contract and seeks the return of US$303 million in investment.   
Dumol (2000) 
Santos (2003) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Europe 
Poland 
(Gdansk)  1992 1996  Lease (30 
Years) 
Positive, despite initial complications 
 
In the early 1990s, the process of democratization, decentralization, and 
market reform in Poland shifted many responsibilities from the central 
government to the municipalities.  One of these reforms included the 
introduction of private sector participation in the water and sanitation sector in 
Gdansk.  In 1991, the municipal council of Gdansk liquidated the regional 
water utility and began negotiations with a French company, Saur, regarding 
the management and operation of the system.  In 1992, the city of Gdansk 
and Saur created a mixed company, Saur Neptun Gdansk S.A. (SNG), with 
49% owned by the city and 51% owned by Saur.  In 1993, the city of Gdansk 
and SNG signed a 30-year lease contract.  The city maintained ownership of 
the assets, responsibility for investment and tariff-setting, and regulatory 
duties.  The private operator took over operation, maintenance, billing and 
collection.  
 
Before private sector involvement, the water and sanitation system of Gdansk had 
numerous deficiencies and was generally in need of more efficient management and 
network expansion.   Although Rivera (1996) describes a complex and tense 
relationship between the city and SNG, which led to contract renegotiation in 1995, 
the lease has had generally positive effects.  Most notably, the private operator raised 
the quality of drinking water to EU standards after a single year, improved 
collections rates, decreased operating costs, and constructed a modern laboratory for 
the effective control of drinking water quality and effluents.  Nonetheless, Rivera 
(1996) notes that the contract did not establish a systemic tariff-setting mechanism, 
and that tariff increases had an “unforeseen” negative impact on water consumption 
levels.      
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Latin America 
Argentina (Buenos 




Most of the case studies looking at the Buenos Aires concession agree that it was 
successful along many dimensions.  The contract was bid based upon the price 
reduction that the winning bidder would implement, resulting in a 27 percent price 
decrease.  In addition, investment increased following the introduction of private 
sector participation, operating efficiency improved, access increased significantly and 
water and service quality improved.  In a detailed cost-benefit analysis, Alcazar et al. 
(2002) estimated that the total welfare gains during the first ten years of the contract 
would exceed $1.6 billion.   
 
However, there were some notable problems.  One problem was that the concession 
contract preserved a complicated, non-transparent pricing scheme that depended on 
several criteria including the zone where the property is located, the quality of the 
residence and the size of the property.  According to Artana et al. (1999) this meant 
that the concessionaire expended considerable effort trying to reassess properties.  
Second, the renegotiations that occurred after the privatization took place led to 
questions about whether the concessionaire had deliberately bid a price that was too 
low to assure sustainability, banking on having the option to renegotiate the contract 
at a later date.  For example, Abdala (1997) noted that the concessionaire would have 
been able to meet contractual obligations regarding its debt to net worth ratio only if 
either prices were increased or it was freed from its investment obligations.  
Subsequent renegotiations in 1994 and 1998 that resulted in price increases resulted 
in public dissatisfaction.  Finally, the regulator was not independent from political 
pressure, leading to concerns about politically motivated interventions.  As in the 
other Argentine cases, the case studies were completed prior to the recent economic 
crisis meaning that they do not address concerns about the medium-term 
sustainability of reform.   
Abdala (1997) 
Alcázar, Abdala and Shirley (2002) 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo 
(1999) 
Crampes and Estache (1996) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 




In 1997, the provincial government of Cordoba signed a 30-year connection contract 
with Aguas Cordobesas, a private company owned by Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and 
domestic investors.  Nickson (2001) reports that the reform was generally seen 
positively by most consumers and by the provincial government.  In particular, he 
notes that consumers benefited from reduced tariffs, improved water quality, which 
resulted in reduced sales of bottled water, improved service quality and reduced 
service cutoffs, and a $13 million royalty payment that was received by the 
provincial government.  He also notes that the company expanded service and 
improved productivity. 
 
However, he does note that there were some potential problems even in the early 
years.  In particular, he noted that there was some concern about public 
dissatisfaction due to supply being cutoff to households that do not pay their water 
bills and that there is a concern that the investment target, which requires that the 
company achieves 97% coverage by 2026 but has no interim coverage goals, might 
result in the concessionaire back-loading investment to the end of the contract.  An 
additional problem, which is not discussed in Nickson (2001), is the potential 
disruption due to the devaluation of the peso and the ensuing economic crisis in 
Argentina at the end of 2001.  Until the crisis is fully resolved, public dissatisfaction 
with liberalization in general and private sector participation in infrastructure in 
particular could lead to contractual disputes that might, in the medium term, threaten 
many sector reforms.. 
Nickson (2001a) 
Argentina 




The provincial government of Corrientes was the first provincial government in 
Argentina to award a concession contract in the water sector.  As for most subsequent 
Argentine concession contracts, the contract was awarded to the company that agreed 
to charge the lowest price (i.e., bidding was over average service price). Most 
performance indicators appeared to improve following the reform.  Coverage 
increased for both water and sewerage services, slightly surpassing contractual 
obligations by early 1996.  Furthermore, the operator increased metering, resulting in 
a reduction in water consumption, reduced unaccounted for water and improved 
productivity.  Artana et al. (1999), however, note some problems with the contract.  
Most notably, they note that the regulator is not independent from legislative 
interference, making it possible for the provincial government to harass the private 
operator.   As in the other Argentine cases, the case studies were completed prior to 
the recent economic crisis and, therefore, questions about the long-term sustainability 
of the reforms remain. 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo 
(1999)                                                                                                                                             43 
 
 







Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Argentina 




In 1998, Salta granted NECON, S.A. an exclusive concession to provide water and 
sewerage services.  Prior to privatization, the General Administration of Water of 
Salta (AGAS) served 43 localities, while the remainder of the population (some 
25,000 of a 1997 total population of 1,000,983) relied on cooperatives and other 
sources.  Among areas serviced by AGAS in 1997, coverage rates were 76% for 
potable water and 68% for sewerage   AGAS’s infrastructure and equipment suffered 
from a lack of investment in renovation, maintenance, and service expansion.  
NECON’s concession stipulated that it could not restrict coverage to urban areas and 
had to grant all municipalities in Salta access to basic infrastructure.  It also 
established universal service as a primary objective, placing more importance on 
water access than on sewerage.  The concession set tariffs according to the costs of 
providing service, and attempted to promote universal access through direct subsidies 
from the provincial government. 
 
Despite minor contractual discrepancies, the privatization has been largely 
successful: By July 2002, coverage increased to 95%; quality improved to the point 
that 99% of water samples met physical, chemical, and bacterial standards compared 
to only 75% before privatization; service interruptions affected only 8% of the 
population served, down from 32%; and the billing system was modernized.  Tariffs 
increased by an average of 14%.  While the operator has been slow to incorporate 
localities not previously served by AGAS, surveys report that consumers and 
provincial and municipal authorities view the concession positively.  Saltiel (2003) 
credits continuous actions by governmental authorities and the firm to stimulate an 
atmosphere of cooperation for the social acceptance of the privatization.    
Salatiel (2003) 
Argentina 
(Tucumán)  1995 2002 Concession 
(30-Year) 
Negative.  Cancelled after Implementation 
 
In 1995, Aguas del Aconquija SA (CAA), a subsidiary of Vivendi, was granted a 30-
year concession to supply the province of Tucumán.  The privatization contract was 
awarded through competitive bidding to the company that agreed to allow the largest 
price reductions, subject to management and investment requirements set by the 
provincial government.  
 
Problems quickly developed, however, and in 1997, the contract was rescinded.   The 
problems started when the concessionaire increased prices, two months after 
assuming responsibility for operations.  The average increase in consumers’ water 
bills was 107%.  Because of tariff rebalancing, some bills rose as much as 300% 
(particularly among the middle and upper class consumers).  This, in turn, resulted in 
80% of the utility’s customers refusing to pay their bills.  In response to the losses of 
roughly $1.5 million per month that resulted from this, CAA suspended its 
investment program.   Eventually, finding requests for government intervention 
ineffective, Vivendi unilaterally rescinded its contract and the operations were 
returned to public control.  Vivendi filed a $100 million suit against the government, 
but an ICSID arbitration panel ruled in favor of the province.    
Rais, Esquivel and Sour (2002) 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo 
(1998)                                                                                                                                             44 
 
 







Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Bolivia 
(La Paz – El Alto)  1997 1999 Concession 
Positive 
 
In 1997, the first major concession contract in Bolivia, in La Paz-El Alto concession, 
was awarded to a consortium, Aguas del Illimani, led by Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux.  
In contrast to other concession contracts (e.g., the Buenos Aires concession contract), 
bidding was conducted over coverage targets rather than tariff reductions.  The 
winning bidder committed to installing 71,752 new water connections in the El Alto 
system (the poorer region) by December 2001.  This would raise coverage in this 
area to 100 percent.  In addition, the concessionaire committed to increasing 
sewerage coverage to 90 and 95 percent in El Alto and La Paz respectively.  The new 
connections had to be in-house connections.  However, the Superintendent did allow 
the concessionaire some flexibility.  In particular, some of the new connections were 
allowed to be lower cost condominial connections. 
 
Prior to the start of the concession contract, tariffs were increased by 38.5 percent.  
However, according to Komives and Brook-Cowen (1998) this left tariffs for low-
income consumers below cost.  Komives (1999, 2001) reports that the concessionaire 
managed to meet its expansions requirements in December 1998, although she noted 
that it had mainly focused on connecting unconnected households in areas where the 
network already reached (i.e., ‘in-fill’ connections) rather than expanding the 
network.  According to data from Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, 57,000 connections had 
been installed by the end of 2000 (Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux 2001).  However, some 
problems apparently remained with the project.  In particular, Hall and Lobina (2002) 
note that there had been press reports of protests concerning the concession.  One 
reported problem was public dissatisfaction concerning price increases, due to fees 
being pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
Komives (1999, 2001) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Bolivia 
(Cochabamba)  1999 2000 Concession 
(40 years) 
Negative.  Cancelled after Implementation 
 
By 1997, the municipal utility covered only 57% of the population, had 50% losses 
in unaccounted for water, and was severely indebted.  Citizens demanded a solution 
to Cochabamba’s acute water problems, and municipal authorities followed the 
model provided by the water concession contract in La Paz and El Alto when they 
initiated contract negotiations in 1997.  After one botched attempt at privatization, a 
second concession contract was signed with Aguas del Tunari (AdT) in September of 
1999.  Included in the contract was a guarantee to the operator of profitability. 
 
Five months after the concession was granted, the population rioted against water 
tariff increases and the contract was cancelled because of pervasive civil disorder 
(thus returning to the former operator, SEMAPA).  The Cochabamba concession fell 
victim to the general social discontent that prevailed at the end of the decade, and 
ultimately failed for three reasons: average tariff increases of 35%, confusion among 
small farmers that they would be charged for irrigation water, and the exclusivity 
rights granted to AdT.  Consumer advocacy groups condemned the tariff increases 
and the contract itself, claiming that they would aversely affect development.  Soon, 
politicians that had supported the privatization declared their opposition to tariff 
increases.  The process was opaque regarding the legal powers of the regulator (the 
Superintendencia Sectorial de Saneamiento Básico, SSSB).  In addition, the SSSB 
failed to carry out a public relations campaign about the concession, and there was 
little consumer participation in the regulatory process.  AdT refused to disclose the 
financial model behind its price rises on the grounds that the model itself was a 
commercial secret.  
Nickson and Vargas (2002) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 




By 1990, the state-owned Santiago Metropolitan Sanitary Works Enterprise 
(EMOS) had run into financial problems.  While service was relatively good, 
EMOS was poorly equipped to keep pace with population growth, and had 
operated at a loss during most of the 1980s.  Rather than fully privatize 
EMOS, authorities chose to reform the enterprise under public management.  
EMOS became a public stock corporation, with 64% owned by the state 
development corporation and 35% owned by the central government.  The 
reform established a coherent legal and institutional framework as well as a 
transparent and consistent tariff policy that offset tariff increases with direct 
subsidies.  It improved accounting and supervision substantially, establishing 
an independent regulator and making extensive use of private service 
contracts.  According to Rivera (1996), by 1996, EMOS was the best-
performing water utility in Chile and quite possibly the best in all of Latin 
America.  Both operationally and financially, EMOS excelled, and water 
coverage reached 100% by 1991.  Rivera largely credits expanded private 
sector participation in the 1990s for the sector’s performance.  Contracts 
were typically awarded through a competitive bidding process for a period of 
two years, with the possibility of extension at EMOS’ discretion.  By 1996, 
more than thirty activities (valued at $13 million a year, and accounting for 
52% of total operating costs) were under service contract.   
Rivera (1996) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Colombia 




Since 1960, the Municipal Public Enterprises of Barranquilla (EPM) had managed 
water and sanitation services.  Political manipulation of the EPM was rife, and the 
state-owned firm reached technical bankruptcy by the early 1990s.  At the end of 
1990, water coverage was only 60%.  Operating expenditures consistently exceeded 
revenues  In 1991, owing to deficient service and poor management, the national 
government supported a process of institutional transformation leading to the 
liquidation of the EPM and the creation of the Sociedad de Acueducto, Alcantarillado 
y Aseo de Barranquilla, S.A. (Triple A).  The District of Barranquilla retained 89% 
of the shares in the newly created firm and sold 11% to the local private sector.  The 
private sector was involved through the creation of a mixed enterprise responsible for 
administering the assets of the system owned by the municipality.  Investment 
remained the responsibility of the district.  In 1995, the municipality reduced its 
ownership to 50% , reduced local private sector participation to 6.69%, and gave 
43.31% ownership to Aguas de Barcelona.  
 
The control retained by the public sector appears to have been a drain on potential 
investment as well as efficiency.  The capital injected was insufficient to meet 
investment requirements (although the situation was improved with the entrance of 
Aguas de Barcelona).  Nonetheless, service provision improved along a number of 
lines following private sector participation.  Between 1991 and 1995, employee 
productivity more than doubled, water coverage increased to 83.3%, sewerage 
coverage increased to 68.6%, and operating revenues moved to exceed operating 
expenditures. 
Avendaño and Basañes (1999) 




In 1995, the municipality of Cartagena signed a lease contract with Aguas de 
Cartagena, which was partially (46%) owned by Aguas de Barcelona (which was 
partially owned by Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux), partially owned by other private 
investors (4%) and partially owned by the municipal government (50%).  The 
contract was negotiated directly with Aguas de Barcelona and was not put out for 
bidding. The new company was given control of a major sector investment program, 
which was financed with a municipal loan (from the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank).  In addition to its participation as a shareholder, Aguas de 
Barcelona also signed a management contract with Aguas de Cartagena, for which it 
received a fixed share of sector revenues. 
 
Sector performance improved following the introduction of private sector 
participation.  The number of connections increased by 30,000 during the first five 
years of the lease, unaccounted for water was reduced, and water quality has 
reportedly improved (with water availability rising from an average of 7 hours per 




Beato and Díaz (2003) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 




In 1991, Colombia’s new constitution legalized private sector participation in 
water service provision.  Of Colombia’s 1091 municipalities, 1070 are 
considered small and medium cities, with populations between 2,000 and 
100,000.  By 2001, Public Service Companies—some public, some private—
serviced only 6% of Colombia’s small cities (those with a population between 
2,000 and 30,000).  The remainder received water directly from the 
municipality, or from state-owned enterprises.  One province in which private 
sector participation was substantially increased during the 1990s was 
Antioquia.  Throughout the decade, municipal authorities in Antioquia began 
signing service contracts with small and medium-sized private operators.  By 
2000, 38 of Antioquia’s 125 municipalities were serviced by a total of 11 
private operators.  Typical of the small cities of Antioquia that introduced 
private sector participation was Marinilla. 
 
In Marinilla (pop. 26,000), a private local company, CONHYDRA, began operation 
in 1997.  In its service contract, CONHYDRA agreed to meet a number of goals with 
respect to coverage and quality of services.  This contract appeared to have a great 
deal of success.  Coverage of both water and sewerage services as well as total 
production increased substantially by 2000, while unaccounted for water decreased.  
CONHYDRA enjoyed good relations with municipal authorities as well as 
consumers, and the rate of satisfaction with service provision increased to 93% in 
2000.  Marinilla has since become a model of private sector participation in the 
operation of water and sewerage services in Colombia’s small and medium-sized 
cities.            
Arévalo and Schippner (2002) 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
Colombia (Montería)  1994  1997  Lease 
Positive 
 
In 1994, the Monería City Council authorized the liquidation of the Municipal 
Public Enterprises of Montería (EPM), which was created in 1955 to provide 
water and sewerage services.  In its place, municipal authorities created a 
mixed enterprise with the exclusive responsibility of providing water and 
sewerage services—the Sociedad de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de 
Montería—SAAM, S.A..  The municipality stipulated that the public sector 
could hold no more than 49% of the shares in the new, mixed enterprise.  
While the municipality retained control of the assets, SAMM was responsible 
for management, administration, and service provision.  In return for use of 
the assets, the enterprise was required to pay an annual sum equal to 10% of 
the total revenues from billings. 
 
Private sector participation did not bring immediate investment, but a legacy of poor 
administration left the sector in dire need of new capital.  While coverage was at 65% 
, water was supplied, on average, for only 3 hours per day.  Nonetheless, only 
$300,000 was spent on capitalization in the years immediately following the creation 
of SAAM.  Despite low investment, however, private sector involvement had a 
number of positive effects on efficiency, and the system generally improved.  
Management was now significantly less politicized, and the size of the bureaucracy 
was considerably reduced.  Among similar Colombian enterprises, SAAM had the 
lowest administrative costs in the country.  Indeed, the number of workers for every 
1,000 connections was reduced from 9.8 in 1992 to 0.3 in 1997.  Water coverage also 
rose, from 65% in 1992 to 75% in 1997. 
Avendaño and Basañes (1999) 
Honduras  




In October of 2000, municipal authorities granted a 30 year concession to the private 
firm Aguas de San Pedro to provide potable water and sewerage services to San 
Pedro Sula.  The municipality had provided these services since the 1970s, first 
through a water department and later through the Municipal Division of Water 
(DIMA).  Tariffs that had been set without regard to costs and then frozen, 
preventing DIMA from undertaking investments needed to keep up with the city’s 
growth in the 1990s.  As the DIMA’s debt increased, municipal authorities decided to 
privatize. 
 
In the concession contract, Aguas de San Pedro agreed to an initial tariff rate lower 
than the pre-privatization rate, with plans to raise the tariff 20% after three years.  
The firm agreed to invest an estimated $208 million to achieve targets including 
100% water coverage within three years (up from 82% at the time of privatization), 
100% sewerage coverage within six years (up from 66%), and 100% treatment within 
four years.  By the end of 2002, water coverage had increased to 92%, sewerage 
coverage to 66%, and water treatment to 15.54%. 
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
México (Cancún and 
Isla Mujeres)  1994 1996 Concession 
(30 years) 
Little immediate progress 
 
In 1983, a constitutional reform placed each municipality in charge of water and 
sanitation provision.  The municipality of Benito Juárez charged a state organization, 
the Comisión de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (Water and Sanitation Commission, 
or CAPA) with this responsibility.  In 1991, CAPA signed a 14-year build-operate-
transfer contract with Desarrollos Hidráulicos de Cancún (DHC), a subsidiary of the 
private firm Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo.  DHC was contracted to build and 
operate a new well production system in Cancún, necessitated by enormous 
population growth.  The BOT agreement, however, did not generate sufficient 
investment.  In 1993, the state, CAPA, and municipal authorities petitioned four 
firms to present proposals for the expansion, operation, and maintenance of the water 
and wastewater system in Cancún and Isla Mujeres.  DHC won a 30-year concession 
and created the firm AGUAKAN to operate the system starting in January of 1994.  
The firm would pay CAPA an annual concession fee of $1 million and the federal 
water agency an annual water extraction fee. 
 
During the first two years, the concessionaire failed to meet targets and did not 
adhere to its investment plan, leading to popular discontent.   The lack of a systemic 
mechanism for setting tariffs led to inefficient pricing.  While production increased 
from 44 million to 47 million cubic meters per year between 1993 and 1995, 
unaccounted for water remained high, at 51% .  As of 1996, AGUAKAN was 
contracting to add 10,000 new water connections and 79 km of sewerage pipeline.  
This would increase water and sewerage coverage from 63% to 74% and  35% to 
45%, respectively, by the end of 1996.  The works remained inactive due to 
insufficient funds.   According to Rivera (1996), AGUAKAN’s meager performance 
is explained by four factors: the macroeconomic crisis of 1994-95, the weakness of 
the regulatory regime, the fact that high costs were passed on to consumers without 
sufficient attempts to increase efficiency, and the concessionaire’s lack of knowledge 
about the sector.  
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Contract  Assessment Case  Studies 
México (México City)  1993  1998  Service 
Contracts 
Positive.  However, benefits were very modest. 
 
The reform enacted in Mexico City involved only minor private sector participation.  
The private companies.  In a three-stage process, private companies would first 
complete a customer census, map the network and install meters.  In a second stage, 
they would assume responsibility for billing, participate in bill collection, establish 
customer care centers, and connect new customers.  In the third and final stage, they 
would become responsible for some aspects of operation and maintenance. Although 
the third stage was supposed to begin about two years after the contract was signed, 
there were serious delays.  Furthermore, contract renegotiations in 1998 appear to 
have reduced the extent of private sector involvement in the third stage of reform.   
 
Despite these problems, the contracts appear to have some success.  In particular, 
Haggarty et al. (2002) note that the private operators managed to improve billing, 
regularize many unbilled connections, and install over 1 million meters.  In addition, 
some measures of service quality have also improved.  However, the minor reform 
failed to improve performance along many other dimensions.  Although the number 
of registered connections increased by about 300,000 during the contract period –
leading to an improvement in the number of employees per 1000 connections, this 
appears to have primarily been the result of the regularization of unregistered 
connections.  Consequently, in practice, the modest reform failed to reduce operating 
costs and failed to introduce a pricing scheme that would curb residential 
consumption.  Given that subsidence due to overexploitation of the aquifer is a 
serious problem in Mexico City, this could impose serious social costs. 
Haggarty, Brook and Zuluaga (2002) 
Trinidad and Tobago 




Negative  (Contract not renewed).  
 
Description:  Management Contract (3-years).  The Water and Sewerage Authority 
(WASA) of Trinidad and Tobago was publicly owned until 1996, when a lack of funding 
and the need for effective management led to private sector involvement.  The 
government opted for a two-phase plan.  In the first phase a private operator would sign a 
management contract with the government.  After this interim phase, the contract would 
be converted to a long-term concession (20-30 years).  At this time, the incumbent 
operator would have first rights of negotiation.  
 
Outcome:  There were some improvements in performance, although these were 
generally more modest that originally hoped for.  The total number of connections 
increased from 200,000 to 300,000; the number of employees per 1000 connections fell 
from 17 to 9.  However, these improvements were short-lived and performance 
deteriorated after the contract ended.  Further, the private management had a poor 
relationship with the company’s board and the government and, ultimately the contract 
was not renewed.. 
Nankani (1997) 
Stiggers (1999) 
Note:  Assessments of outcomes only include information up to the most recent information available in the case studies cities. 
 




Table A2:  Effect of Reforms Involving Private Sector Participation on Sector Performance, Quantitative Measures of 
Performance 
Effect of Reform Involving Private Sector Participation  Case Studies 
Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Effect of Reform Involving Private Sector Participation  Case Studies 
Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Effect of Reform Involving Private Sector Participation  Case Studies 
Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Rais, Esquivel and Sour (2002) 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo 
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Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Effect of Reform Involving Private Sector Participation  Case Studies 
Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Country 
(City)  Year  Type of 
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Appendex 2: Data Assembly Detail 
 
In Latin America, numerous governments have initiated water privatization or private 
sector participation in water and wastewater services.  In some countries, governments have 
enacted changes in service provision at the national level, while others have been at the level of 
the state, province, municipality, or city.  In those countries where private sector participation 
(PSP) has not been universal, the juxtaposition of privatized and non-privatized water utilities 
within a single country offers a unique opportunity to study the effects of PSP on service 
delivery (and, in particular, on rates of coverage for water and sanitation services).    
In order to obtain data on access to piped water and flush toilets at the level of particular 
cities, states, and provinces, it was necessary to consult credible household surveys administered 
in those countries in which PSP occurred.  In the 1990s, many Latin American nations benefited 
from the Programa para el Mejoramiento de las Encuestas y la Medición de las Condiciones de 
Vida en América Latina y el Caribe (the Program for the Betterment of Surveys and the 
Measurement of the Living Conditions of Latin America and the Caribbean, or MECOVI).  The 
program is a joint initiative of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Economic Commission for Latin 
American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  Its central objective is to aid Latin American countries 
in generating adequate and high quality information regarding the living conditions of their 
peoples.  Owing to MECOVI as well as the efforts of national statistical agencies throughout 
Latin America, many high-quality household surveys are available for numerous countries and 
years.  These comprehensive surveys comprise information on education attained, income levels, 
and access to infrastructure for households throughout each country.  They thus include 
sufficient information to study the changes in water and wastewater service access among 
different income and education groups over time. 
Prior to selecting which surveys to employ, it was necessary to identify those countries in 
which water privatization or PSP has occurred in certain areas of the country while the sector has 
remained in public hands in other areas.  This involved a rather involved literature review and 
the consultation of experts both in Latin America and the United States.  The review of Latin 
America’s experience with water privatization led us to establish a list of countries that would 
provide potentially interesting contrasts between regions with and without PSP.  Within each of                                                                                                                                             61 
 
 
these countries, we attempted to identify as many cases as possible of water privatization or PSP 
in the water sector.  At the same time, we carefully recorded the populations of those cities, 
states, and provinces which experienced PSP in the water sector and identified numerous control 
cities, states, and provinces with similar populations but without PSP. 
Of those countries with non-universal private sector experience in water and sanitation 
service provision, many could not be included in our dataset for two main reasons: First, for 
several countries, high-quality household surveys for years preceding and following PSP in the 
water sector were simply not available.  Specifically, we deemed it necessary to have survey data 
from a year preceding PSP and at least one survey from the period of between two and five years 
after PSP.  This would provide an accurate picture of service coverage before PSP and service 
coverage once the PSP was in full effect.  Where such a broad range of years was not available, 
existing surveys for that country were of limited usefulness.  A second limiting factor was the 
nonexistence of sufficient household identification variables to identify whether a particular 
household was in the area affected by the PSP initiative.  Where privatization or PSP occurred in 
a small or limited capacity, it was necessary to have sufficient variables to identify which 
households were in that small region.  While coverage rates following state or province-wide 
PSP were easy to observe because nearly every survey dataset contained a variable for the 
province or state in which a household was located, smaller geographical areas (such as small 
and sometimes large cities) were often not identifiable using the location variables provided in 
some datasets.  Consequently, in countries where privatization or PSP occurred at a level for 
which insufficient location identification variables existed in that country’s surveys, the country 
had to be dropped from our dataset.   
Such limitations resulted in a rather short list of countries: Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.  
Despite these limitations, however, our panel dataset contains a large number of  observations 
because we included numerous years and numerous cities, states, and provinces from each of the 
countries with useable survey data. 
For each country in our dataset, we selected multiple survey years based on several 
factors:  first, the years for which adequate surveys were available, and second, the years in 
which noteworthy cases of privatization or PSP occurred.  All attempts were made to gather 
survey data from the years immediately preceding PSP (ideally, from at least one survey in the 
period of between zero and three years before PSP) and for at least one year in the period two to                                                                                                                                             62 
 
 
five years after PSP.  Once survey years were selected, the list of control cities, states, and 
provinces (earlier selected based on the criterion of having populations similar to those of 
regions with PSP in water) was finalized based on the availability of geographical location 
identification variables for each household.  Where the number of control regions that could be 
identified far exceeded the number of regions that experienced PSP, only those with populations 
resembling those of the regions with PSP were considered.  Where the number of control regions 
that could be identified was rather small, population similarity was given less weight in order to 
amplify the sample of control cities.   
Once all countries, survey years, and sub-regions of countries were selected, the survey 
data on access to piped water and flush toilets within each geographical unit of interest (state, 
province, city, etc) was disaggregated by: 1) rural vs. urban regions, 2) education level (none, 
primary, primary or lower, secondary, or tertiary education) of male-headed, urban households, 
and 3) economic well-being (in income terms) of urban households. 
Constructing variables for varying levels of educational attainment and income-related 
economic well-being involved yet another series of decisions about how to define each variable 
and at what level to disaggregate the data.  Generally, where the institutions that generate and 
release the datasets created variables for rural and urban regions as well as household per capita 
income aggregates, these were utilized in the interest of consistency.  All of the datasets that we 
employed contained variables differentiating rural and urban regions, as this was necessary to 
our ability to use a dataset and thus was one of the criteria for selecting surveys.  Where per 
capita household income aggregates were not found along with the dataset, they were 
constructed by summing income from all earned and unearned sources that could be identified 
based on the questions of the survey.  Based on the per capita household income of each 
household in the dataset, households were divided into income quintiles.  In the case of Bolivia, 
where the sample size and consequently the number of observations in the dataset was smaller, 
households were also divided into income terciles as well (thus increasing the number of 
observations in each income quantile).  The following table indicates the source of household per 
capita income data for each of the ten surveys employed: 
 
 





SOURCE OF AGGREGATE HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
DATA 
Argentina/ 1995  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) 
Argentina/ 1999  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) 
Argentina/ 2000  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) 
Argentina/ 2001  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) 
Argentina/ 2002  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) 
Bolivia/ 1995  Each respondent recorded three types of earned and unearned 
income: income from the primary occupation, if employed 
during the last web, income from a secondary occupation, if 
employed by a second job during the last web, and total 
income from other sources.  These three types of incomes were 
summed across individual and then across households, and the 
total household income was divided by the number of 
household members in order to get a measure of total per 
capita household income. 
Bolivia/ 1999  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia) 
Bolivia/ 2001  Household Income per capita variable accompanied the dataset 
(created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia) 
Brazil/ 1995  Total Household Income and total number of household 
members variables accompanied the dataset (created by the 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) 
Brazil/ 2001  Total Household Income and total number of household 
members variables accompanied the dataset (created by the 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística)  
 
In dividing individuals into groups of different educational attainment, it was desirable to 
generate an interesting contrast between individuals while maintaining a sizeable number of 
observations in each group.  In general, individuals were classified as having primary education 
if they had any type of formal education (even as low as literacy courses, adult education, or 
preschool) that was below secondary education.  Those completing any number of years of 
secondary education (up to and including a diploma from a secondary institution) were classified 
as having secondary education.  Any type of post-secondary education (university coursework, 
post-graduate coursework, etc) was classified as tertiary education.  Finally, individuals lacking 
formal education of any kind were identified as having no education.                                                                                                                                               64 
 
 
Owing to the diversity of survey questions (particularly between countries) regarding an 
individual’s educational attainment, these definitions of education produced slightly divergent 
groups of individuals in each country.  One of the main problems encountered because of this 
occurred in the case of Bolivia.  There, the myriad of questions regarding specific educational 
attainment (questions about numerous types of post-primary education were listed on the survey 
instrument) resulted in a very small sample size for the no education group.  Our solution to this 
problem was to create a new education group for each of the Bolivia surveys, comprised of 
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